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Abstract. This paper discusses the signiﬁcance of volun-
tary arrangements for the water and agricultural policies in
the European Union. The current implementation of the Eu-
ropean Water Framework Directive (WFD) and the reform
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) require new ap-
proaches in water management. As many case studies have
shown, co-operative agreements (CAs) between water com-
panies, farmers and authorities can help to reduce environ-
mental pressures on water bodies. The main reasons for
that are: i) water companies are ready to advise and ﬁnan-
cially support farmers in changing production methods; ii)
changes of farming practices are tailored to the site-speciﬁc
requirements; iii) farmers and water companies are interested
in minimising the costs and environmental pressures as they
beneﬁt, for example, from modernization of farming me-
thods, and reductions in cost of water treatment, and iv) vol-
untarily agreed commitments to change farming practices are
often stricter than statutory rules. Moreover, precautionary
rather than remedial measures are preferred. Tackling dif-
fuse pollution is one of the main concerns of the WFD. CAs
can enhance the cost-effectiveness of actions within the pro-
grammes of measures so that good water status is achieved
by 2015. In CAs all relevant stakeholders, located in catch-
ment areas of agricultural usage, can be involved. Thus, they
can help to foster integrated water resources management. In
particular, disproportionate costs of changing farming prac-
tices can be identiﬁed. With regard to the recent CAP reform,
ﬁnancial support for farmers will be linked to compliance
withenvironmentalstandardsandfurthercommitments. This
concerns both direct payments and agri-environmental pro-
grammes. The experience gained in CAs can provide infor-
mation on best agricultural practices. Informed farmers are
more ready to meet environmental requirements. Because
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CAs implement the most cost-effective changes in farming
practice, it can be assumed that farmers will not face consid-
erable costs due to the new EU water and agricultural poli-
cies. Some examples of CAs are described and the signiﬁ-
cance of CAs in the implementation of the WFD and CAP
reform will be highlighted. The article closes with an out-
look on the needs of future research activities.
1 Introduction
The implementation of the European Water Framework Di-
rective (WFD) and the reform of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) require new approaches in environmental pol-
icy. The achievement of good status of water bodies by 2015
is one of the main challenges. The key elements of the CAP
reform of 2003 and 2004 are: i) “decoupling” direct pay-
ments to farmers from production, ii) linking the granting
of ﬁnancial aid to the compliance with environmental stan-
dards and further commitments (e.g. food safety and animal
health), and iii) support for rural development. In particu-
lar, environmental problems related to water and soil could
be solved for instance by reducing diffuse pollution, conser-
ving aquatic biotopes, and more efﬁcient utilisation of scarce
water resources in irrigated agriculture.
As many studies have shown, voluntary agreements bet-
ween farmers and other stakeholders can enhance the ef-
fectiveness of environmental regulations. Due to the self-
interest of each of the parties involved in such agreements,
the costs of changing farming practices can be reduced, so
that the achievement of environmental objectives will be as-
sisted. Each of the participants in such agreements is moti-
vated to exchange knowledge and expertise in order to ﬁnd
out those combinations of measures that will improve their
situation. For instance, water companies are informed by
farmers on their fertiliser and pesticides usage to demon-
strate their efforts to reduce or prevent pollution. On the
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other hand, farmers expect compensation payments from wa-
ter companies and free advisory services. Similarly, water
companies advise farmers on conversion to more sustainable
farming practices in order to prevent costly remedial mea-
sures (such as water treatment, closing wells and conveyance
of remote water resources).
The water authorities are interested in promoting such
agreements, and they advise both farmers and water com-
panies in their applications for public funding from agri-
environmental programmes. Moreover, the authorities of-
tenacceptvoluntarily-agreedcommitmentsassubstitutesfor
compulsory rules as they recognise that such agreements can
make the enforcement of regulations more effective. There
are several reasons for that. Due to the collaboration of wa-
ter companies with farmers, the changes of farming practices
can be tailored to the site-speciﬁc conditions and environ-
mental problems in water catchments. The monitoring sys-
tems installed by water companies are often more advanced
than those of the authorities. Moreover, voluntarily-agreed
commitments to change farming practices are often more
stringent than mandatory rules; this is because water compa-
niesareusuallymoreinterestedinpreventingpollutionrather
than in lessening damages. For instance, as many examples
of agreements show, the retention periods for the application
of nutrients on farmland are longer and the values for pollu-
tants are often below statutory limits (Heinz et al., 2002a).
Tackling diffuse pollution caused by agriculture is a key
concern of the WFD (EU Regulation 2000/60). It can be ex-
pected that the cost-effectiveness of actions needed to imple-
ment the programmes of measures (Article 11) will be en-
hanced by voluntary agreements. Moreover, the WFD re-
quires that rising trends in pollution need to be reversed, and
further deterioration should be prevented. As mentioned,
agreements between farmers and water companies aim to
prevent further pollution and avoid the need of any future
water treatment or other measures, such as closing wells and
conveyance of remote resources. Consequently, agreements
promote sustainable water use based on long-term protec-
tion of available resources. In some EU Member States such
agreements have already been established for more than 20
years. It is assumed that the beneﬁts in terms of reduced
loads of nutrients and pesticides in water bodies will become
apparent by 2015.
According to Article 4 (5) of the WFD, the achievement of
water-related objectives should be affordable and should not
cause disproportionate costs. As voluntary agreements are
open to all relevant interest groups, the various cost-beneﬁt
impacts resulting from the objectives and measures used to
reach them are taken into account. Thus, disproportionate
costs of changes in farming practice which only result in in-
signiﬁcant improvements in water status can be avoided.
With regard to the recent reform of the CAP, one of the
new requirements is to link ﬁnancial aid provided to farm-
ers to a better compliance with environmental standards and
further commitments concerning public health, animal wel-
fare and occupational safety. This requirement concerns both
the direct payments (EU Regulation 1782/2003) and subsidy
programmes to support for rural development (EU Regula-
tion 1698/2005). The experiences gained in voluntary agree-
ments can provide useful information on best agricultural
practices. Good knowledge of the site-speciﬁc hydrological
and agricultural conditions is indispensable in determining
the appropriate local objectives and the most cost-effective
measures to achieve them. All these factors can inﬂuence the
compliance with environmental standards. The more cost-
effective these measures are, the easier compliance with the
rules becomes. Curtailments of direct payments or ﬁnancial
support to farmers can possibly be avoided. In the best case,
where voluntary agreements result in full compliance with
the required water-related standards, the threat of reduced
payments to farmers concerning both EU regulations can be-
come irrelevant. Thus, it can be supposed that farmers lo-
cated in water catchment areas can minimise their ﬁnancial
burdens due to the CAP reforms, if they convert to good agri-
cultural practice as a result of voluntary agreements.
Further policy measures can help to make voluntary agree-
ments more effective in order to assist the implementation
of the WFD and CAP reforms. One of them is ﬁnancial
assistance of such agreements from the revenues of water
abstraction charges. By that, small water companies can
afford to ﬁnance voluntarily-agreed commitments, such as
compensation payments to farmers, paying agricultural ad-
visers and monitoring services. Such a funding is already
practised in some European Member States. Cases can be
found, for instance, in the German Bundesland Lower Sax-
ony. In another Bundesland, North Rhine-Westphalia, such
abstractionchargeshavebeenrecentlyestablished: thosewa-
ter companies who have founded voluntary agreements with
farmers can compensate their expenditure by the exemption
from paying charges.
In the next section, the environmental effectiveness and
economic efﬁciency of voluntary agreements between farm-
ers, water companies and authorities will be demonstrated by
representative examples. It should be mentioned that volun-
tary agreements could also aim to settle conﬂicts on use of
scarce water resources. In such cases – which are not dis-
cussed further here – agreements between farmers and other
water users can play an important role in regions with water
shortage. In the subsequent sections, various policy instru-
ments that can promote voluntary agreements will be pointed
out, and the signiﬁcance of such agreements for the imple-
mentation of the WFD and CAP reforms will be highlighted.
2 Experiences on voluntary agreements with farmers
The objective of the EU-wide research project “Co-operative
Agreements in Agriculture as an Instrument to Improve the
Economic Efﬁciency and Environmental Effectiveness of the
European Water Policy” was to investigate the occurrence
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and impacts of co-operative agreements (CA) between wa-
ter suppliers and farmers (Heinz et al., 2002b; Brouwer et
al., 2003; Heinz, 2004). In this project, around 50 case stu-
dies across 15 EU Member States were carried out. CAs are
deﬁned as voluntary agreements entered into as a result of
negotiations between farmers and water companies. Author-
ities participate either directly or indirectly (Box 1).
In nine out of 15 EU Member States CAs were found (Ta-
ble 1). However, there was large variation in terms of num-
bers, objectives, commitments and funding. Whereas only
one CA exists in the UK, 435 CAs could be identiﬁed in Ger-
many. In France with 70 CAs, advising farmers is the main
purpose funded by different ﬁnancial sources. However, only
in some cases are water companies directly involved. The
key players are chambers of agriculture, and water agencies.
In contrast, in Germany compensations paid directly by wa-
ter suppliers to farmers, and bilaterally binding agreements,
play a central role. In each of both countries, more than
30000 farmers are involved. The agricultural area covered
by CAs is about 1.6Mioha in France and 0.8Mioha in Ger-
many. A remarkable number of CAs – relative to the size of
the country – could also be found in The Netherlands (nine
cases), involving around 1500 farmers and covering a total of
4000ha. In the study, the water volumes protected by CAs
were also estimated. There are many explanations for this
unbalanced occurrence of CAs in the EU, such as different
shares of groundwater in water abstraction, the assignment
of statutory groundwater protection zones, difﬁculties in en-
forcement of compulsory rules, and the willingness of water
companies and consumers to pay the costs of encouraging
farmers to change their production methods. Particularly in
Denmark and Germany, there is a strong preference from
public to receive drinking water which needs no “chemical”
treatment and which is as pure as possible, going even be-
yond statutory quality standards. This attitude is a major mo-
tivation for water suppliers and authorities to give priority to
precautionary measures by controlling pollution at source by
changing farming practices.
As the case studies mentioned above showed, CAs pro-
vide the opportunity to inﬂuence effectively the behaviour
of farmers. Because regulatory approaches have difﬁculty in
tackling pollution from non-point sources, both water sup-
pliers and authorities rely increasingly on voluntary agree-
ments. This does not mean that compulsory rules become
needless. Special rules are enforced in any case (for instance,
ban of hazardous pesticides). Compulsory rules are applied
if CAs do not work. Local authorities are often announcing
their application to apply pressure on farmers to meet volun-
tary agreements. Principally, mandatory regulations, such as
water acts, serve as legal framework to implement standards
or limit values through compulsory and voluntary commit-
ments.
With regard to the environmental effectiveness of CAs,
there are important factors to be taken into consideration. For
many CAs it can take a long time (sometimes several years
Box 1. Features of co-operative agreements.
– Voluntariness and self-interest of the parties involved
– Self-regulation among the participants
– Involvement of the water suppliers as initiator of negotia-
tions and key provider of ﬁnancial resources
– Targeted to a speciﬁc area (water catchment area; water
protection zone)
– Written agreements between at least one water supplier
and farmers.
and even decades) until improvements in water quality can
be determined due to, for instance, the depth of the aquifer,
the type of soil, and the recharge rate. Other inﬂuencing fac-
tors can be changes in crop patterns and climatic conditions
(e.g. rainfall, temperature). In many cases, water-protective
production methods introduced as a result of the CA could be
used as indicators to assess the environmental effectiveness.
Examples for changes in farming practice are intercropping,
reduction of fertilisers and pesticides, and conversion to per-
manent grassland. Reductions of the nitrate content in the
soil after harvesting, or of the concentration of the pollutant
in the percolating water, could be used as further indicators.
When assessing the impacts of CAs other beneﬁts, such as
greater biodiversity, more healthy foods, improved image of
drinking water and agricultural products, should be also con-
sidered.
The economic efﬁciency of CAs can be assessed by com-
paring the total expenditure for changing farming practices
(including advisory programmes and monitoring services)
with the costs saved, such as in water treating or blend-
ing, conveying remote resources, using mineral fertilisers
and pesticides. A CA is economically efﬁcient if the dif-
ference between the total saved costs, which are equivalent
with economic beneﬁts, and the total expenditure is positive,
i.e. the economic net beneﬁt has a value greater than zero.
It can be expected that farmers and water companies have
strong incentives to increase the net beneﬁts of CAs as far as
possible because both parties can gain (win-win situation).
Farmers get compensation payments and save costs by im-
proving their production methods, and water companies save
costs of remedial measures. All these information can be col-
lected by questionnaires at water catchment areas (Heinz et
al., 200b).
In cases where the CAs were designed signiﬁcantly to
maintain a better water quality than prescribed by statutory
standards (e.g. 50mg/l nitrate concentration), the economic
efﬁciency can also be assessed; however, the economic bene-
ﬁtscannotbemeasuredintermsofsavedcostsbywatercom-
panies (there is no risk that the standards will be reached, so
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Table 1. Occurrence of CAs in the EU Member States (a).
Country Number of Farms Agricultural land Water abstraction
agreements involved (1000ha) (million m3)
Austria 4 285 0.4 3.8
Denmark 3 415 3 <2
Finland 1 400 10 <1
France (b) 70 39200 1598 2150
Germany 435 33200 850 1880
Luxembourg 1 12 0.2 <1
Netherlands 9 1490 4 320
Sweden 3 100 3.4 24
UK 1 10 0.9 7
TOTAL 527 ±75000 ±2500 ±4400
(a) Some ﬁgures are based on estimates especially in those countries with large numbers of CAs. The reference year is 2002.
(b) Mostly advisory services only.
Source: Brouwer et al. (2003), p. 25.
that no alternatives exist with which the cost of the CA can
be compared – such as water treatment cost). Water compa-
nies are interested in making agreements with farmers which
involve a least-cost combination of measures to change farm-
ing practices; this is in order to reduce compensation pay-
ments to farmers. In these cases, the assessment of the eco-
nomic efﬁciency of CAs can be based on a cost-effectiveness
analysis given speciﬁc water-related goals to be met by the
CAs.
It is noteworthy that in Germany nearly 90% of the CAs
can be identiﬁed as cases that aim to reach concentrations
below statutory standards – in contrast to 31% in France and
55% in the Netherlands (Brouwer et al., 2003). Moreover, it
shouldbeemphasisedthataround75%ofallCAsestablished
in nine Member States (referred to in Table 1) are targeted to
preventstatutorystandardsbeingexceededinthefuture, orto
maintain an even better water quality. The reason for this is
that water suppliers usually seek to avoid remedial measures
(e.g. water treatment). In the water sector, CAs are seen as
an effective instrument to prevent the exceeding of statutory
limits, or to reverse the increase in pollution before it can
reach a level which would exceed such values (Heinz, 2004).
In the following, a few examples of CAs investigated in
the EU research project mentioned above will be described
(most of them updated to 2006 ﬁgures). A typical case with
positive economic net beneﬁts is the drinking water supply of
the town “Viersen” in the German Bundesland North Rhine-
Westphalia (Table 2). There are four groundwater catch-
ments, each with a special agreement. The CAs involve
in total around 200 farmers, and cover a total agricultural
area of around 3000ha. The main agricultural products are
maize, cereals, grass, pig fattening and dairy cattle. The
total delivery of the water company is 5.5millionm3 sup-
plying around 80000 people. “Viersen-S¨ uchteln” is one of
four catchments. Viersen is a town of about 77000 inhab-
itants surrounded by intensively used farmlands. About 25
years ago the water company reacted to the increasing ni-
trate concentration in groundwater by building deep wells.
This measure led to a signiﬁcant decrease in the average ni-
trate concentration in drinking water from 80 to 35mg/l in
the nineties. However, the use of deep groundwater did not
prove to be a long-term solution due to hydrological reasons.
Although the company purchased farmland near to the water
works, the effectiveness of this measure was limited, so that
the only solution was to enter into negotiations with farmers.
As a result, the nitrate concentration in groundwater has been
decreasing continuously, so that the average value of 35mg/l
in drinking water has been maintained, and the installation
of a treatment plant could be avoided. As Table 2 shows,
the economic net beneﬁt resulting from the CAs amounts at
least to 253000Euro per year. Consequently, a signiﬁcant
increase in water charges could be prevented. The propor-
tion of the costs of the agreements to the water charge is only
3.5%. A further beneﬁt resulting from this solution is the
reversal of increasing pollution of the groundwater in accor-
dance with the preventative principle, by which the natural
resource will be protected in contrast to the “end-of-pipe”
approach.
Another example is the co-operative agreement “Stever-
talsperre” located in the German Bundesland North Rhine-
Westphalia (Table 2). The reason for the establishment (in
1989) of this CA was the pollution of surface waters with
pesticides. In order to meet the limit in drinking water of
0.1µg/l, the water company installed treatment facilities, in-
cluding inﬁltration by activated carbon, to eliminate the pol-
lutants. The objective of the CA was to achieve area-wide
agricultural practices without yield and income losses, and
to reduce water treatment costs in the long run. The princi-
pal focus of the CA was the provision of advisory services,
ﬁnanced by the water company. However, special ﬁnancial
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Table 2. Examples of co-operative agreements.
106 m3/a EUR/a EUR/m3
CA “Viersen”
Groundwater abstraction 5.5
CA expenditure of the water company 395000 0.07
Saved costs in water treatment
50% treatment 648000 0.12
75% treatment 972000 0.18
Economic net beneﬁt More than 253000
CA “Stevertalsperre”
Water abstraction 100
CA expenditure of the water company 480000 0.005
Saved costs in water treatment 1000000 to 0.10 to
1500000 0.15
Economic net beneﬁt More than 520000
CA “Holsterhausen/¨ Ufter Mark”
Groundwater abstraction 25
CA expenditure of the water company 420000 0.016
CA “Munich-Mangfalltal”
Groundwater abstraction 90
CA expenditure of the water company 765000 0.008
Source: Heinz (2004)
supports – some in conjunction with state funds – have been
provided for particular measures. More than 800 of around
2000 farmers settled in the catchment area, which covers ap-
proximately 90000ha, participate in the CA. The farmland
involved covers around 30000ha which is used mainly for
arable farming, with maize and cereals being the dominant
crops. The water company delivers around 100millionm3
per year, abstracted from the CA region, to about 1.8million
people. The total expenditure of the water supply com-
pany for monitoring systems, advisory services, compensa-
tion payments and research projects amounts on the average
to 480000Euro per year, or 0.005Euro/m3 .
In the following years the pesticide concentrations de-
creased slightly, so that the use of activated carbon could be
reduced temporarily resulting in cost savings, which varied
yearly. For instance, in the period 1989–1999 the use of ac-
tivated carbon could be reduced from 1200tons to 200tons
per year. This development was inﬂuenced also by the ban
of particular pesticides, such as atrazine. Since 2005, no
water treatment by activated carbon is needed. This result
shows – conﬁrmed by the water supplier – that the voluntary
agreements with farmers are successful (Kooperation Land-
und Wasserwirtschaft, 2007). The economic net beneﬁt re-
sulting from changes in farming practice varies from 0.5 to
1millionEuro per year. The increase of the water costs due
to the CA is about 0.005Euro/m3, equivalent to a proportion
of 0.3% to the water price. In the future there are uncer-
tainties, in particular, with regard to the application of new
pesticides, so that the water company is interested in contin-
uingtheCAtoavoidfurtherwatertreatmentandmaintainthe
cost savings. Special water-protective measures, for instance
the use of computer-based pesticide sprayers, can be funded
from these cost savings. Despite the advantages of the CA,
the water authorities are still challenged in controlling ef-
fectively the enforcement of mandatory regulations, such as
those concerning banned pesticides.
An example established in order to maintain the existing
good quality of groundwater is the CA “Holsterhausen/¨ Ufter
Mark” in the German Bundesland North Rhine-Westphalia
(Table 2). This agreement – one of six CAs between the wa-
ter company (total water abstraction of around 85millionm3
per year) and farmers – was founded in 1992 and includes
about 320 farmers covering around 10000ha. The av-
erage groundwater abstraction in this particular catchment
amounts to 25millionm3 per year. The water company ﬁ-
nancially aids the purchase of modern equipment that re-
sults in applications of fertilisers and pesticides targeted to
the actual needs of the plants. They include drag hoses,
technically-advanced pesticide sprayers, and equipment such
as hoes. Further expenditure concerns water-protective mea-
sures, such as intercropping, under-seeding, and better ap-
plications of semi-liquid manure. All these measures help
farmers to comply more effectively with mandatory rules
that require the use of environmentally-friendly farming me-
thods. As a result, the concentration of nitrate in drink-
ing water decreased from 13mg/l on average to 7mg/l (the
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Box 2. Co-operative agreement Fromme Valley – Dorset, Wessex
Water, UKa.
– Operating since 1998
– 19 Ml/d at risk (total 144 Ml/d at risk equivalent with ap-
prox. one third of the total water supply)
– Signiﬁcant increase of nitrate concentration
– Water treatment currently applied
– Cost of nitrate removal plant approx. £1.2 million/year
(2000 prices)
– Considerable cost savings could be achieved by the CA if
treatment could be partially or entirely abandoned
– Management Plans for farmers ﬁnanced by the water com-
pany
– Catchment management by paying agricultural advisors
– Applying the Catchment Sensitive Farming Scheme (CSF)
– Improved monitoring and modelling
– Financially restrained due to the inability to pass on costs
to consumers
a Heinz et al. (2002b)
current mandatory limit value is 50mg/l). Pesticide loads
cannot be detected. The total expenses of the water com-
pany amount to about 420000Euro per year, corresponding
to 0.016Euro/m3. The proportion to water price is 0.9%.
Both the water company and farmers are keen to apply the
most effective water-protective methods in order to avoid ex-
cessive costs. Thus the goal of this CA is to achieve a com-
bination of measures that maximises the cost-effectiveness
of maintaining good water quality. In this particular case,
the CA aims to protect the groundwater resources to a depth
of about 100m against pollution by pesticides and nitrate.
Consequently, the water company can continuously provide
customers with high-quality drinking water, with only a neg-
ligible increase in water costs.
There are many further examples. In the German Bun-
desland Hesse, the data of 671 water works were assessed
in a recent research project (Bach et al., 2007). By using
the regression analysis applied to 11 water works regarding
the nitrate pollution of groundwater a trend of decreasing or
signiﬁcant slowing down of nitrate concentration could be
proved in 5 cases. In further 3 cases, a decrease of nitrate
concentration could be observed. As the authors point out,
CAs are deﬁnitively a successful instrument for groundwater
protection, even though the long time required to determine
improvements in water quality currently does not allow to
obtain similar results from other cases. Another study to as-
sess systematically the impacts of CAs was carried out in the
German Bundesland North Rhine-Westpalia (IWW, 2007).
In this study covering an about 20000ha agriculturally used
area statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuences could be found.
The conversion to organic farming is certainly the biggest
changeinagriculturalpractice. IntheregionofMunichinthe
German Bundesland Bavaria an example of such a CA can be
found. In the CA “Munich-Mangfalltal”, founded in 1993,
around 100 farmers are involved covering about 2500ha of
agriculturally used land. The water supplier abstracts about
90millionm3 groundwater for more than 1 million inhabi-
tants of the town of Munich (Table 2). Similar to the pre-
vious case, the goal of the CA is to maintain good drink-
ing water quality. At the beginning of 1990 the rising trend
concerning the amount of nitrates and pesticides in ground-
water continued, although the concentrations were still far
below the limit values. Almost 70% of the farmland within
the CA is grassland and no intensive animal breeding exists.
The main characteristics of agricultural practice are organic
farming (no use of agro-chemicals, upper limit for livestock)
and mulch seed in maize cultivation. The water company
spends about 765000Euro per year, or less than 0.01Euro
per m3, for compensation payments and advisory services.
The proportion of the water price is 0.7%. Additional pay-
ments to farmers are provided from public funds. Since the
foundation of the CA, the nitrate concentration in groundwa-
ter has decreased from 15mg/l to 8mg/l. The concentration
of pesticides declined to the detection limit. In terms of cost-
effectiveness in maintaining a high-quality drinking water,
similar can be said as in the previous case.
As the EU research project on CAs (Heinz et al., 2002b)
showed, there are more good examples in other EU Member
States that prove the effectiveness of voluntary agreements
between farmers, water companies and authorities. In the
UK, currently only one case with some elements of CAs
– managed by Wessex Water Services Limited (Stanﬁeld,
2006) – could be identiﬁed (Box 2). In this country many
voluntary measures to tackle the problems of diffuse pollu-
tion caused by agriculture have been launched. However,
they are based more on governmental agri-environmental
programmes rather than on direct negotiations between wa-
ter companies and farmers in local catchments. An exam-
ple is the Catchment Sensitive Farming Scheme (CSF). This
scheme was introduced in 2005 in response to diffuse pollu-
tion impacts on biodiversity. It is mostly focused on reducing
phosphate and soil erosion. Catchment ofﬁcers are employed
to educate farmers. Another example is the Environmental
Steward Scheme (ESS) of 2005 that aims to enhance biodi-
versity and where farmers are ﬁnancially supported (Harris,
2006).
All these initiatives contribute to less pollution in areas of
agricultural usage; however, they may be less efﬁcient than
CAs where farmers are paid by water companies on the basis
of mutual commitment, and on their site-speciﬁc expertise
concerning the environmental conditions and needs. Both
parties are motivated to determine the least-cost and most ef-
fective conversion of farming practices and both can win, not
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only in economic terms but also by improving their image in
public (for instance, more healthy agricultural products and
drinking water). One of the main reasons why CAs are cur-
rently not wide-spread in UK is the fact that it is not possible
for water companies to pass on costs, such as compensation
payments, to consumers through water charges. A further
aspect with regard to CAs as instruments to prevent pollu-
tion of water resources may be relevant: in contrast to some
other EU Member States, such as Denmark and Germany, the
readiness of the public and water consumers to pay for going
beyond mandatory environmental standards (e.g. for nitrate
concentration)seemstobelimited. Furthermore, manyofthe
UK regulators have strong reservations against paying pol-
luters not to pollute. They rely more on mandatory rules in
order to meet the polluter pays principle (Richardson, 1998).
On the other hand, as the Wessex Water case and many
other examples show, water companies must respond to the
increasing loads of nutrients and pesticides in waters with
costly treatment measures. At the end, the consumers are
faced with far higher water prices than needed if the costs
of CAs were passed on to them instead. However, the treat-
ment approach has the advantage that the compliance with
standards (such as for pesticides in drinking water) can be
achieved with a high degree of certainty, whereas the preven-
tative approach by employing CAs is sometimes less certain
due to unexpected events in the water catchment area. A
further factor of uncertainty is the long lag times between
the measures taken and the improvement of the aquatic en-
vironment, particularly in areas where immediate action is
required to meet statutory drinking water quality, and where
the limited availability of water resources does not allow for
transitional measures (such as closing wells and water blend-
ing). A clear disadvantage of the treatment approach, how-
ever, is the fact that it “leaves the problem in the ground”
(Stanﬁeld, 2006). Ironically, a few cases in the EU exist
where the water companies have to pay twice: simultane-
ously both to compensate and advise farmers and to treat the
pumped water. But these cases are temporary and preferable
to the pure treatment approach.
3 Policies to support voluntary agreements with far-
mers
It is remarkable that in some EU-Member States voluntary
agreements between water suppliers and farmers are rare or
do not exist at all, even though serious problems caused by
agricultural-related water pollution exist. The obstacles for
a widespread implementation of this approach in the United
Kingdom are mainly institutional. As mentioned, the Gov-
ernment does not permit the passing on of costs of the agree-
ments to the water consumers as part of the water company’s
operation cost. Apparently in the UK there is a move to
change these prohibitive regulations, which would lead to the
establishment of more agreements (Harris, 2006). In Italy,
the authorities may declare the enforcement of the stricter
rulesrequiredintherecently-establishedstatutorywaterpro-
tection zones. Because of the advantages of the voluntarily-
agreed commitments in terms of economic efﬁciency, this
wouldtriggernegotiationsbetweenwatersuppliersandfarm-
ers. Economic incentives and targeted advisory services for
farmers would be the key elements of this approach. As long
as the implementation of compulsory rules in water protec-
tion zones remains difﬁcult, there are good reasons for estab-
lishing such agreements. Top-up funding of agreements by
using public ﬁnancial resources may additionally facilitate
a more widespread application of the voluntary approach in
Italy, especially in those regions where the ﬁnancial capabil-
ity of water companies is limited.
As mentioned already, a further policy could be the intro-
duction of water abstraction charges. From the revenue of
these charges the costs of agreements can be ﬁnanced. Such
a regulation exists in the Bundesland Lower Saxony in Ger-
many, where the payments of water suppliers both to farmers
and to agricultural advisers are reimbursed by the Govern-
ment from the revenue of water abstraction charges. Thus,
even in catchments with small water suppliers and limited
ﬁnancial resources, CAs with farmers can be ﬁnanced.
Moreover, authorities can promote the establishment of
agreements with farmers by giving preference to the outcome
of negotiations over compulsory rules (Heinz, 2002). Exam-
ples of giving priority for voluntarily-agreed commitments
can be found in the German Bundesl¨ ander Bavaria, Hesse
and North Rhine Westphalia. In these Bundesl¨ ander it is pos-
sible to complement, or even replace, statutory rules in wa-
ter protection zones by agreements between water companies
and farmers. The rationale for that is the insight that less reg-
ulated obligations are more cost-effective as the parties are
interested in co-operating to improve their economic situa-
tion. In cases where compensation payments have to be pro-
vided to farmers by law in water catchment areas with stricter
requirements, these payments can be determined more effec-
tively within the framework of CAs, because they are better
adapted to the site-speciﬁc conditions, and the acceptance by
farmers can be reached more easily. This is especially true in
cases where farmers get “compensation payments by result”,
i.e. dependent on the environmental beneﬁts achieved rather
than being paid by ﬂat rates, such as for commitments that
consider the area of farmland only (e.g. intercropping). An
example exists in the CA “Viersen” described above. For-
merly granted ﬂat payments related to, for instance, land
planting have been replaced recently by a premium which
considersthenitratecontentinthesoil, measuredbytheNmin
residual value, depending on the type of cultivation. The
farmers involved in the CA get, in the case of corn produc-
tion, 25Euro per ha if this value is less than 80kgN/ha, and
50Euro per ha if this value is less than 60kg N/ha. Neverthe-
less, it remains difﬁcult to link payments with improvements
in water quality because such improvements resulting from
changes in farming practice can take a long time (years, even
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Table 3. Water Framework Directive (WFD).
Requirements Date of
achievement
Set-up of river basin management plants 2009
Achievement of cost recovery and incentive water pricing 2010
Establishment of cost-effective programmes of measures 2012
Achievement of good status of water bodies 2015
Justiﬁcation of derogation from good status of water bodies 2015
Source: Directive 2000/60/EC of 23 October 2000.
decades). A further problem may be seen in windfall prof-
its for changing production methods that would have been
occurred also without ﬁnancial support. However, as the
cases analysed indicate, such windfall proﬁts are probably
less than the economic beneﬁts farmers receive from CAs.
Water companies make usually great demands on farmers
as they aim to prevent or reverse water pollution. Agricul-
tural experts payed by water companies are commissioned to
monitor farmers’ behavior. In addition, authorities are con-
trolling the compliance with mandatory commitments.
As the EU research project on CAs (Heinz et al., 2002b)
showed, the provision of governmental agri-environmental
programmes as top funding can promote the establishment
of CAs. This is currently practised mostly in those coun-
tries where CAs exist. However, if the requirements placed
on farmers for receiving ﬁnancial aid are becoming stricter,
the possibilities of top-up funding will be increasingly limi-
ted in those cases where the compliance with these require-
ments is conditional for the granting of such support. Com-
pliance with such requirements is a feature of programmes
funded by the EU Commission. A special case of top fund-
ing is the CA of Munich-Mangfalltal (Table 2). Here about
half of the payments granted to farmers are funded from an
agri-environmental programme, as in this catchment area the
content of the CA requires the exclusive practice of organic
farming.
A further option to promote CAs in those countries where
such agreements are not common, is the establishment of
statutory water protection zones together with stricter rules
and compensation payments to farmers by law, in particu-
lar, if water companies are committed to pay. In those cases,
water companies may prefer to pay farmers on the basis of
voluntary agreements rather than regulated by compulsory
rules. As mentioned already, such agreements are usually
more cost-effective. Farmers can also beneﬁt because the
conversion of production methods targeted towards the needs
of the catchment area can improve their economic position,
particularly if the compensation-by-result agreement is being
applied.
4 Co-operative agreements and the implementation of
the WFD and CAP reforms
As the outcome of co-operative agreements between farmers,
water companies and authorities in terms of preventing and
reducing pollution indicates, the environmental goals in wa-
ter catchments can be reached more efﬁciently than by the
exclusive enforcement of mandatory rules. As examples in
water catchments show, regulatory measures in order to im-
plement the polluter pays principle can promote even reme-
dial measures rather than the protection of water resources.
This does not mean that the polluter pays principle is turned
on its head. In CAs, farmers usually have to meet statutory
rules prescribed in mandatory regulations. Site-speciﬁc com-
mitments going beyond these rules are ﬁnancially supported.
There are cases, where advisory services provided by water
companies for free are sufﬁcient (Heinz et al, 2002b). Tack-
lingdiffusepollution, inparticularthatcausedbyagriculture,
is a key concern of the WFD. According to this regulation,
rising trends in pollution need to be reversed and further de-
terioration prevented. Furthermore, measures to achieve a
good water status have to be cost-effective and should not
result in disproportionate costs (Table 3).
In the following, the reasons why CAs can contribute to
the implementation of the WFD are summarised:
1. They aim to prevent increases of pollution, and reverse
rising trends. In many cases CAs result in decreases
below the permitted limits, (for example, nitrate values
fall under 50mg/l, and pesticides decline to the detec-
tion limit). Water companies give preference to precau-
tionary rather than remedial measures (e.g. water treat-
ment). This corresponds with Article 7 (3) WFD.
2. Each of the parties involved have a common interest
in determining cost-effective measures to reach site-
speciﬁc goals, as required in Article 16(6) WFD. The
outcome of CAs can even be identiﬁed as win-win-win
situations: more efﬁcient farming methods, cost savings
in the water sector, and successful enforcement of statu-
tory rules.
3. In determining the site-speciﬁc objectives of changing
farming practices, the economic beneﬁts are compared
with the costs of the measures. By doing that, dispro-
portionate costs in achieving these objectives can be
avoided according to Article 4 (5 and 6) WFD. More-
over, certain precautionary and remedial measures can
be given priority in order to use limited ﬁnancial re-
sources as effectively as possible.
4. All relevant interest groups can participate as required
in Article 14 WFD. This ensures the exchange of exper-
tise and the articulation of group-speciﬁc preferences.
Conﬂicts between water companies, farmers and au-
thorities can be settled in most cases by negotiations. In
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Table 4. EU Regulation 1782/2003.
Requirements Applicable
from
Maintenance of farmland in good status 2005
Maintenance of long-term grassland 2005
Compliance with 19 existing EU regulations concerning
– Nitrate, sludge, groundwater, natural habitats, wild fauna and ﬂora 2005
– Pesticides, food, animal health 2006
– Animal protection, etc. 2007
Source: Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for support schemes under the common
agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers.
the end, this helps authorities to enforce statutory rules
(such as good agricultural practice).
5. The experiences gained through CAs can be applied
to watersheds where no water companies are operat-
ing. By doing that, area-wide protection of water re-
sources against pollution from agricultural sources can
be achieved according to Article 4 WFD.
With regard to the CAP reform, the “decoupling” (i.e. sep-
aration) of direct payments to farmers from the volume of
production will have positive impacts on water quality (even
though several Member States have only partially decoupled
certain direct payments). Decoupling direct payments from
production volumes can reduce economic incentives for in-
tensive production. Agricultural products that have adverse
effects on the aquatic environment can be reduced without
losses of direct payments. Nevertheless, changing farming
practices can lead to income losses due to increased costs or
reduced sales revenues.
Furthermore, the EU Regulation 1782/2003 is playing an
important role (Institute for European Environmental Policy,
2005). In particular, this regulation encourages farmers to
comply with water-related and other standards concerning
public health, food safety, animal welfare and good ecolog-
ical conditions in order to avoid curtailments of direct pay-
ments (Table 4). Moreover, according to the EU Regulation
1698/2005 good agricultural practices prescribed by manda-
tory rules laid down in environmental laws at national and
EU level must be considered by farmers as a condition for
being ﬁnancially assisted. One example is the Nitrates Di-
rective 91/678/EEC. This Directive stipulates the identiﬁca-
tion of all water affected by nitrate pollution, and prescribes
action programmes for the control of nitrate inputs in des-
ignated vulnerable zones. It includes compulsory rules for
farmers to change their production methods concerning, for
instance, the application and storage of semi-liquid manure.
Generally speaking, at EU and national level a wide spec-
trum of water-related regulations exists that contain manda-
tory commitments for farmers, that are also relevant to the
new CAP regulations mentioned. Thus one of the require-
ments of the WFD, the polluter pays principle, can be ful-
ﬁlled.
The reasons why CAs can facilitate the implementation of
the upcoming CAP reforms include:
1. In many CAs, farmers are committed by contract to
meet statutory rules prescribed by regulations at EU,
national and local level. As far as the Statutory Man-
agement Regulations (SMR) associated with the cross
compliance regulation address water-related Directives
(such as the Nitrates Directive), this regulation can help
to achieve the WFD aims. The same can be applied
to the good agricultural and environmental conditions
(GAEC) that are deﬁned by the Member States. If
farmers involved in CAs do not meet these rules, they
can lose the ﬁnancial aid provided by water companies
and complementary public funds. Again, these commit-
ments can ensure that farmers meet the polluter pays
principle as they agree to comply with these rules with-
out compensation payments.
2. The cost-effectiveness of CAs plays an important role
because this element can contribute towards the limita-
tion of the ﬁnancial burdens placed on farmers in meet-
ing statutory rules. CAs aim at achieving site-speciﬁc
objectives in water catchments as cost-effectively as
possible. The economic beneﬁts of CAs usually exceed
their costs, especially in cases where remedial mea-
sures, such as pumping deeper aquifers, water treat-
ment, and development of remote resources, can be
avoided. Those cases are appropriate models for achie-
ving good agricultural practices as required, particularly
in the EU Regulation 1698/2005 concerning aid for ru-
ral development. Here, CAs can help to identify the
site-speciﬁc environmental needs and the most appro-
priate measures to meet them. In addition, the speciﬁc
local agricultural conditions, such as the different pro-
ductivity and yield prospects, can be taken into account.
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3. Water companies can provide farmers with ﬁnancial as-
sistance and advisory services in complying with statu-
tory commitments, particularly related to the cross-
compliance regulation (EU Regulation 1782/2003),
even though this regulation focuses on mandatory com-
mitments and may be less compatible with CAs. Exam-
ples of water-protective measures are the maintenance
of grassland, set-aside of farmland, and retention pe-
riods for spreading semi-liquid manure. However, the
obligations agreed upon in CAs often go beyond such
commitments, such as prescribed by the Nitrates Direc-
tive and the new EU Groundwater Directive of 2007.
For instance, the retention periods for applying ma-
nure and mineral fertilisers agreed in CAs often exceed
compulsory commitments by several weeks and even
months, as, for example, in the CA “Viersen” (Table 2)
where spreading is not allowed between 1 September
and 15 February, in contrast to the statutory rule with a
retention period between 1 November and 31 January.
4. CAs are open for further interest groups to participate,
such as nature conservation bodies. By that, environ-
mental, ecological and other goals, such as conservation
of landscapes, can also be subjects of agreements. Ex-
amples of such area-wide and multi-domain agreements
in water catchments can be found in the German Bun-
desland Lower-Saxony (Nolte and Osterburg, 2006). In
this Bundesland, the so-called “Gebietskooperationen”
have been founded in 28 sub-river basins. For each
of these basins a river management plan, including the
agricultural sector, will be established (Heddinga, 2006;
Newig, 2006).
5. Experience gained in CAs regarding the most appro-
priate changes in farming practice can be transferred
even to regions where CAs do not exist. Depending
on the different site-speciﬁc conditions, these changes
can be used as models for granting payments to farm-
ers according to the EU Regulations 1782/2003 and
1698/2005. For both regulations the compliance with
rules of good agricultural practice is conditional. The
compliance with the requirements is dependent on
the site-speciﬁc hydrological, agricultural and socio-
economic conditions. Particularly with regard to the
latter regulation, the experiences gained in CAs can
help to apply agri-environmental programmes as cost-
effectively as possible. Examples are the employment
of advanced techniques in spreading semi-liquid ma-
nure, the switchover of arable to grassland, and the ex-
change of farmland with different crop patterns (Nolte
and Osterburg, 2006). On the other hand, particularly
with regard to the cross compliance regulation practical
difﬁculties may emerge as the requirements are deﬁned
normally at a central level, while water protection rules
aim to tackle regional or local problems.
It is noteworthy that the requirements speciﬁed in the WFD
can play an important role as commitments for the agricul-
tural sector in performing the CAP reform (Ecologic, 2006).
In particular, the reports according to Art. 5 WFD can pro-
vide information for setting the objectives relevant for im-
plementing the rural development measures related to wa-
ter problems. Furthermore, according to the Art. 38 and 39
of Regulation 1698/2005 support shall be granted to farmers
for costs incurred and income forgone resulting from disad-
vantages in the areas related to the implementation of WFD
and other relevant EU Directives. Payments cover only those
commitments going beyond mandatory requirements. The
impacts of the ﬁnancial supports provided is inﬂuenced inter
alia by the extent to which the supported measures are tai-
lored to the local conditions and environmental needs. Ad-
visory services for farmers how to apply these measures can
also enhance the effectiveness of the supports. In light of
the statements made above CAs can contribute directly and
indirectly to achieving simultaneously the objectives of the
WFD and CAP policies in numerous ways (Box 3) (Heinz et
al., 2002a).
5 Conclusions
Do “soft” regulations matter? (Just and Heinz, 2000). Are
voluntary approaches needed to enforce compulsory rules?
The importance of CAs has also been proved for other envi-
ronmental policies (Carraro and L´ evˆ eque, 1999; Hagedorn,
2002). Although there are recent studies on CAs related to
water policies (Water4All, 2006; WagriCo, 2007), further re-
search activities are needed. First, the various applications of
CAs in Europe and other countries (O’Toole, 1998; Gasteyer,
2003) and their impacts on the aquatic environment should
be analysed. Meanwhile, the investigation carried out from
1999 to 2002 (Heinz et al., 2002b) must be updated and ex-
tended to the larger European Community (to include the 27
Member States who have joined since then). Do CAs exist in
the new Member States and what are their features? How can
countries without CAs learn from the Member States with
experiences in the ﬁeld of voluntary approaches to tackle wa-
ter problems?
The effects of CAs in terms of environmental effective-
ness and economic efﬁciency, and the lessons learned over
the past years, should be pointed out in an area-wide com-
parative analysis. By updating the results from previous in-
vestigations, the impacts of CAs on water status with a long-
term perspective will be demonstrated. This perspective is
needed as it usually takes many years to measure these im-
pacts. Such an analysis could provide new insights on cost-
effective strategies in protecting water bodies against envi-
ronmental pressures, and can assist the implementation of
the EU water and agricultural policies.
The assessment of the contribution of CAs to reach the
WFD objectives should focus on issues such as: more
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efﬁcientuseofscarcewaterresourcesinirrigatedagriculture,
reduction of pollution from diffuse sources, enforcement of
the polluter pays principle, and achievement of good water
status. In addition, a better knowledge of the role of CAs in
the process of implementing the CAP reform in conjunction
with water policy is needed. The role of CAs in achieving the
objectives of the CAP reform, including the support for rural
development, cross-compliance regulation and de-coupling
policies, is to be analysed in greater detail.
Furthermore, the advantages of area-wide CAs covering
entire watersheds should be pointed out. In contrast to
CAs located in contained water catchment areas, basin-
wide agreements between stakeholders will become increa-
singly important for the establishment of river basin man-
agement plans as regulated in the WFD. In particular, CAs
can help to settle conﬂicts between farmers, water compa-
nies and other stakeholders in developing cost-effective pro-
grammes of measures. Typical examples for such integrated
water management on a voluntary basis can be found in
the German Bundesl¨ ander Lower Saxony (Heddinga, 2006)
and Schleswig-Holstein (Grett, 2007). As the latter exam-
ple shows, in particular, the stakeholders involved (including
farmers) could found an agreement on measures that must
be postponed until after the WFD deadline 2015, otherwise
disproportionate costs would emerge.
Theroleofarea-wideCAsinsynchronisingtheimplemen-
tation of the WFD and CAP reform should be analysed in
greater detail. For instance, the programme of measures to
be established in river basins according to Article 11 of the
WFD can impose restrictions in land use, such as more ex-
tensive farming or set-aside of agricultural land. Some of
those restrictions are also required by CAP regulations in
the particular areas. In such cases, experiences gained with
CAs may provide advice on how to ﬁnd an agreement with
farmers by negotiation. With respect to possible curtailments
of direct payments or ﬁnancial assistance to farmers, CAs
may help to ﬁnd agreements among the stakeholders in wa-
ter catchment areas, and cases can be identiﬁed where ex-
emptions are to be made due to disproportionate costs ac-
cording to Art. 4 (5) WFD. By specifying more precisely the
local commitments based on the rules of good farming prac-
tice and ﬁnding out the most cost-effective measures to meet
them, the enforcement of the polluter pays principle as re-
quired by the WFD can be assisted. CAs employ monitoring
equipment that is often more effective than the control sys-
tems used by authorities. Furthermore, CAs can help to dis-
tinguish the additional needs and requirements as regulated
in the WFD, from the rules of good agricultural practice.
The provision of such site-speciﬁc information will assist
the authorities in granting agri-environmental programmes to
farmers by tuning those commitments to the local conditions,
that go beyond the compulsory rules.
Training programmes to improve and implement CAs are
to be developed in regions where fewer experiences on vol-
untary arrangements could be gained. Last but not least, fac-
Box 3. Co-operative agreements support WFD and CAP.
– Prevent increase of pollution
– Reverse rising trends of pollution
– Determinecost-effectivemeasurestoachievewater-related
and other objectives
– Contribute to the implementation of the polluter pays prin-
ciple
– Avoid disproportionate costs
– Incorporate stakeholders
– Advise farmers on complying with environmental and
other standards
– Keep ﬁnancial burdens of farmers and water consumers
moderate
– Improve the effectiveness of agri-environmental pro-
grammes in watersheds
– Assist integrative water management by area-wide and
multi-domain agreements
tors hampering the successful implementation of CAs, es-
pecially in countries where such agreements hardly exist,
should be analysed and appropriate strategies on how to re-
move barriers are to be examined. Factors hampering the
wide-spread application of CAs include the preference of
some water companies for installing treatment plants in or-
der to ensure the compliance with statutory quality standards,
high demands of farmers for compensation payments (espe-
cially in case of intensive livestock farming), and the long
time delay between establishing a CA and meeting regula-
tory standards. In addition, special regulations can impede
the creation of CAs, such as the inability of water companies
to pass on the costs to the consumers, as previously men-
tioned.
However, as the experience gained in some EU Member
States indicates, the effectiveness of the EU water and
agricultural policies, both strongly interrelated, can be
improved by voluntary approaches. The lessons learned in
these States should be transferred to those countries where
CAs are not common and where the command-and-control
measures prevail.
Edited by: S. Barles
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